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At first blush the Federal Tort Claims Act may seem puzzling and coun-
terintuitive. Its overall purpose is to provide a tort remedy for persons
injured by wrongful acts or omissions of the federal government, but it
contains numerous exceptions, exclusions, and pre filing requirements that
frequently bar such claims. By and large, it provides full compensation to
persons injured by commonplace negligence of government employees,
but no remedy for those whose claims involve intentional torts, rest on
strict liability theories, or arise from a hodgepodge of other circumstances.'
Paul F. Figley has been the associatedirector of the Legal Rhetoric Program at the T#lsh-
ington College of Law, American University since 2006. His previous experience includes
thirty-two years as a litigator for the Department ofJustice, representing the United States
and its agencies in appellate and district court litigation involving torts, national security,
and information law. The author thanks Patricia Fitzgerald for her research assistance.
Some scholars have suggested that aspects of the statute are confusing or
contradictory.2
The aim of this essay is to present a straightforward explanation of how
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) functions as a limited waiver of the
United States' sovereign immunity. Judge Max Rosenn of the Third Cir-
cuit provided a particularly useful metaphor when he spoke of "a travers-
able bridge across the moat of sovereign immunity."J This essay builds on
that metaphor to explain the structure and operation of the FTCA.4 It is a
simple explanation, intended as a starting point for understanding FTCA
jurisprudence.5
I. SETTING THE STAGE: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND THE BACKGROUND OF THE FTCA
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the exclusivevehicle for suits against
the United States or its agencies sounding in tort.6 It is also the exclusive
remedy for the common law torts of federal employees acting within the
scope of their employment.7 It is a successful statute that has largely met
2. See, e.g., Dianne Rosky, Respondeat Inferior: Determining the United States' Liability for the
Intentional Torts ofPederal Law Enforcement Officials, 36 u.c. DAVISL. REV.895 (2003) (argu-
ing that the doctrine of respondeat superior creates contradictions in doctrine based on the
controlling state law);Richard W Bourne, A Day Late, a Dollar Short: Opening a Governmental
Snare Which Tricks Poor Victims out of Medical Malpractice Claims, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV.87, 87
(2000) (claiming that the FTCA acts as a trap when Congress designates certain medical
practitioners as federal employees); \¥illiam P.Kratzka, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort
Liability of Government and Its Employeesfor Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN.LJ. AM.U.
1105 (1996) ("the structure of the FTCAinvites confusion").
3. Judge Rosenn used this phrase in Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir.
1979), a suit brought as a class action by a soldier allegedly injured in a nuclear weapons
test. Plaintiff argued that the United States could be sued for money damages for deliberate
violation of constitutional rights under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
ofPederal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (finding a constitutional tort cause of ac-
tion against federal officials who allegedly violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights),
and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Judge Rosenn rejected that argument, reasoning,
"[b]ecause [plaintiff] has sued the Government itself, Bivens and Butz do not afford him a
traversable bridge across the moat of sovereign immunity." Jaffee, 592 F.2d at 717.
4. The essay also suggests how the "moat of sovereign immunity" might be used to explain
the FTCA in a classroom or lecture hall setting. For fifteen years I have used the metaphor at
presentations for various groups of attorneys and, more recently, first-year law students.
5. An in-depth analysis of the FTCA and related issues is provided in the excellent three-
volume treatise LESTERS. JAYSON& ROBERTC. LoNGSTRETH,HANDLINGFEDERALTORT
CLAIMS(2007).
6. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) (holding unanimously
that claims for constitutional torts are not cognizable under the FTCA). Meyer also held that
federal agencies are not subject to direct suit for constitutional torts under Bivens. !d. at 486.
Likewise, the United States has not waived sovereign immunity for suits under the Civil
Rights Acts. Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1973) (federal government is
exempt from 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
7. 28 U.S.c. § 2679(b)(I).
Congress's reasons for enacting it. It creates an effective administrative
procedure that efficiently resolves without litigation the vast majority of
tort claims against the federal government.8 It grants the federal courts
subject matter jurisdiction to decide those claims that cannot be settled,
subject to specific limitations set forth by Congress.9 In doing so it ef-
fectively transferred responsibility for deciding disputed tort claims from
Congress to the courts.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a key foundation of the FrCA.IO
This doctrine, as it is understood in American jurisprudence, provides that
a sovereign state can be sued only to the extent that it has consented to be
sued and that such consent can be given only by its legislative branchY
"Thus, except as Congress has consented to a cause of action against the
United States, 'there is no jurisdiction ... in any ... court to entertain suits
against the United States.' "12 This body of law is the moat protecting the
United States from suit.
Before Congress enacted an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity,
Americans injured by torts of the federal government could not sue it for
damages.13 This did not leave them without a remedy because the First
Amendment guaranteed their right to petition the government for redress
of grievances. 14 From the early daysof the Republic, citizens askedCongress
8. See JAYSON& LONGSTRETH,supra note 5, § 17.01; Jeffrey Axelrad, Federal Tort Claims
Act Administrative Claims: Better Than Third Party ADR for Resolving Federal Tort Claims, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 1331 (2000) (arguing that the administrative claim system is efficient because
it enables many claims to be settled before reaching court).
9. See, e.g., 28 U.S.c. §§ 1346(b) and 2680.
10. While the origins, validity, and value of the doctrine of sovereign immunity are beyond
the scope of this essay, the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking money dam-
ages is grounded on the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 7. The first half of the clause is the Appropriations Clause. The second half is the State-
ment and Accounts Clause. The clause reads in full: "No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time." /d. See Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2009).
11. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
12. /d. (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941»; United States v.
Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) ("If any principle is central to our understanding of sover-
eign immunity, it is that the power to consent to such suits is reserved to Congress."); United
States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940) ("Consent alone gives jurisdiction
to adjudge against a sovereign .... Public policy forbids the suit unless consent is given, as
clearly as public policy makes jurisdiction exclusive by declaration of the legislative body.").
13. See generally Cohensv. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411-12 (1821) ("The universally received
opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the
judiciary act does not authorize such suits. ").
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Paul Fredric Kirgis, Section 1500 and the Jurisdictional Pitfalls
of Federal Government Litigation, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 301, 302 (1997) (citing WILSON COWEN
ET AL.,THE UNITED STATESCOURT OF CLAIMS,A HISTORY,PARTII: ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-
JURISDICTION,1855-1978, at 9 (1978».
to enact special legislation granting a financial remedy for particular inju-
ries caused by the government.15 The legislative process, however, proved
ill-suited for resolving tort claims.16John Quincy Adams complained about
the inordinate time Congress spent on claims matters.17Millard Fillmore
urged that a tribunal be established to handle private claims. IS Abraham
Lincoln called for such a change in his first annual message to Congress.19
Over the years Congress enacted laws establishing remedies for a wide
variety of claims, beginning with the 1855 Court of Claims Act20that was
interpreted to exclude tOrts.21In 1886 it enacted the Tucker Act that ex-
plicitly excluded tortsY In the following years it passed numerous statutes
providing some form of tort remedy for various categories of claimants,
including horse owners,23oyster growers,24and persons injured by opera-
tions of the Post Office.25From the early 1920s pressure grew for enact-
15. See Hearings on HR 5373 and HR 6463 Before House Judiciary Committee, Serial No. 13,
77th Cong, 2d Sess., at 49 (1942) [hereinafter Hearings on HR 5373 and HR 6463].
16. See id. at 49-55, Appendix II, Criticisms by Congressmen of Existing Procedure of Re-
lief by Private Claim Bills; Kent Sinclair & Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations of Actions Under
the FICA: A Synthesis and Proposal, 28lIARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1,6 (1991); Axelrad, supra note 8,
at 1332 ("Moreover, congressional committees were ill-suited for sifting through claims and
fairly determining the worth of individual injuries.") (citing 1-2 JAYSON& LONGSTRETH,supra
note 5, § 2.08 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 69-667, at 1-2 (1926».
17. Hearings on HR 5373 andHR 6463, supra note 15, at 49.
18. 5 JAMESD. RICHARDSON,A COMPILATIONOFTHE MESSAGESAND PAPERSOFTHE PRESI-
DENTS91 (2004). President Fillmore reasoned that
Congress has so much business of a public character that it is impossible it should give
much attention to mere private claims, and their accumulation is now so great that many
claimants must despair of ever being able to obtain a hearing. It may well be doubted
whether Congress, from the nature of its organization, is properly constituted to decide
upon such cases.
/d. (First Annual Message, Dec. 2, 1850).
19. "The investigation and adjudication of claims in their nature belong to the judicial de-
partment." Hearings on HR 5373 and HR 6463, supra note 15, at 46 (citing First Annual Mes-
sage to Congress, Dec. 3, 1861, CONGoGLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., Pt. III, app., pp. 1,2).
20. The Court of Claims Act was enacted February 24, 1855, 10 Stat 612.
21. Spicer V. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 316 (1865); Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7
(1863). See alsoJAYSON& LONGSTRETH,supra note 5, § 2.03.
22. The Tucker Act, enacted March 3,1887,24 Stat. 505, presently in 28 U.S.c. §§ 1346(a),
1491, provides a remedy for actions "not sounding in tort," although the original House ver-
sion had included torts. 18 CONGoREC. 622 (1887), cited in JAYSON& LONGSTRETH, supra
note 5, § 2.04, n.25.
23. Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat 843; amended by Act ofjanuary 31, 1931,46 Stat 1052,
and currently in 16 U.S.C. § 502(d) ("to reimburse owners of horses, vehicles, and other
equipment lost, damaged, or destroyed while being used for necessary fire fighting, trail, or
official business").
24. Act of June 25,1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 941 (oyster growers' damages from dredging
operations, 28 U.S.c. § 1497).
25. Act ofjune 6, 1921,42 Stat 63 (Appropriations, Second Deficiency Act).
ment of a comprehensive law to more efficiently handle tort claims against
the government.26 The number of claims continued to increase and the
burden of serving on the claims committees became more onerous.27 Be-
tween 1920 and 1946 Congress considered more than thirty bills dealing
with the subject.28 Finally, on August 2, 1946, the FTCA was enacted as
part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.29
This background shows that Judge Rosenn's description of sovereign
immunity as a moat protecting the United States from suieo is perceptive
and apt. When it enacted the FTCA, Congress created a drawbridge across
that moat. The dimensions, prerequisites, and gaps of that drawbridge will
be addressed in the remainder of this essay.31
II. THE SCOPE OF THE FTCA: THE DIMENSIONS
OF THE BRIDGE AND EXCLUDED CLAIMS
When Congress granted district courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear
FTCA suits, it defined the scope of its waiver of sovereign immunity in
the jurisdictional grantY In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer, the
26. )AYSON& LONGSTRETH,supra note 5, § 2.09[1]-[2]. See also Floyd D. Shimomura, The
History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial
Model of Payment, 45 LA.L. REv.625, 674 (1985) ("By the late 1920's [sic], the accommoda-
tion regarding congressional payment and judicial non-enforceability of judgments began to
break down.").
27. JAYSON& LONGSTRETH,supra note 5, §2.08, nn. 8-9. See also Dalehitev. United States,
346 U.S. 15,24-25 (1953) (referring to the private bill system as "notoriously clumsy") (citing
H.R. REp.No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2).
28. JAYSON& LONGSTRETH,supra note 5, § 2.09[1].
29. Pub. L. No.79-601, 60 Stat 812,842 (1946) (AnAct to Provide for Increased Efficiency
in the Legislative Branch of the Government).
30. Jaffeev. United States, 592 F.2d 712,717 (3d Cir.1979).
31. While discussing sovereign immunity and the FTCA's background, the lecturer can
capture the audience's visual attention by simultaneously creating the necessary fulcrum for
the "bridge across the moat of sovereign immunity" metaphor-a castle. This might be done
in several ways, but one proven method is to use scissors to cut battlements along one side
of a cardboard box. (I use a white, photocopy paper box. I have found it useful to precut the
drawbridge and the vertical segments of the battlements.) With care, the background discus-
sion and the battlements can be finished simultaneously. The audience will recognize the
object as a castle.
At this juncture the lecturer can identify Judge Rosenn and his metaphor. With that expla-
nation, the audience will understand that the box!castle represents the interests of the United
States and that a drawbridge cut in the castle symbolizes the FTCA. At this point I take from
inside the box a blue, construction paper moat complete with sea monsters (created for me
some years ago by the seventh-grade son of a colleague), hold it up, and ask the audience what
it is. Invariably someone correctly identifies it as the moat of sovereign immunity. The stage
is now set for explaining how the statute functions.
32. 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(I):
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Coun of
Supreme Court confronted the issue whether the ITCA waived the United
States' sovereign immunity for constitutional torts.33 To resolve that issue,
the Meyer Court dissected the language of the jurisdictional grant:
Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction over a certain
category of claims for which the United States has waived its sovereign im-
munity and "render[ed]" itself liable. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1,
6,82 S. Ct. 585, 589, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962). This category includes claims
that are:
"[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, ... [3] for injury
or loss of property, or personal injury or death [4] caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government [5] while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, [6] under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b).
A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant-and thus is "cognizable" un-
der § 1346(b)-if it is actionable under § 1346(b). And a claim is actionable
under § 1346(b) if it alleges the six elements oudined above.34
This analysis effectively explains why courts lack subject matter jurisdic-
tion over claims that do not fall within the precise language of the jurisdic-
tional grant.35 Claims not encompassed by the language of § 1346(b) are
excluded from the ITCM; general waiver of sovereign immunity and could
never fit on the ITCA bridge.36
The first three elements of § 1346(b) are straightforward and can be
brieflyaddressed.37 Simply put, the ITCA cannot be used to sue any per-
the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
33. 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994). Meyer was brought by a former employee of a failed savings
and loan association who was discharged, allegedly in violation of his due process right to
property (continued employment), by the government agency that acted as receiver of the
institution. The Court held that Meyer's constitutional tort claim was not cognizable under
the FTCA because a private person would not be liable on such a claim under state law. Id. at
477-78 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b».
34. Id. at 477.
35. "Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature." !d. at 475.
36. Of course, the FTCA is only one bridge across the moat of sovereign immunity; other
bridges might be cut on the shorter sides of the box/castle. These might be identified as the
Tucker Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act.
37. The presentation here is simplified so it can be readily understood. There are nuances
to almost every FTCA issue.
son or entity other than the United States.38The only remedy available
under the ITCA is "money damages,"39and then only for claims "for in-
jury or loss of property, or personal injury or death .... "40The other ele-
ments of § 1346(b) have received more attention.
Because the jurisdictional grant is for torts arising from a "negligent or
wrongful act or omission,"41the ITCA does not support claims for strict
or absolute liability. For example, the Supreme Court held that suits arising
from sonic booms do not fall within the ITCA.42 Likewise, claims alleging
strict liability for blasting43or other ultrahazardous activity are barred,44as
are claims arising under strict liability dram shop acts45and state statutes
modeled on § 402A of the Restatement (Second) ofTorts.46
38. See, e.g., Denneyv. U.S. Postal Serv., 916 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (D. Kan. 1996) (citations
omitted) (finding that plaintiff had not named the correct defendant in her personal injury
claim after falling on the sidewalk in front of the post office because the ¥rCA permits only
the United States to be sued, not the agency allegedly responsible for the tort).
39. See, e.g., Janis v. United States, 162 Fed. App'x 642, 643-44 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
¥rCA would not support injunction prisoner sought "to stop prison officials and employees
from hindering ... plaintiff from redressing his grievances").
40. See, e.g., Idaho ex rei. Trombley v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 666 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir.
1982) (barring state's claim for fire-fighting costs because they were not "for injury or loss
of property"); Oregon v. United States, 308 F.2d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1962) (same); People of
California v. United States, 307 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1962) (same).
The statue places other limits on damages. It bars punitive damages and prejudgment inter-
est. 28 U.S.c. §2674. It limits the amount of post-judgment interest. 28 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1).
No award can exceed the amount claimed administratively, absent newly discovered evidence
or intervening facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). It also limits attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2678.
41. 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(I).
42. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972). See also Peak v. Small Business Admin., 660 F.2d
375, 378 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The holding in Laird did not indicate that such claims are not
governed by the provisions of the ¥rCA, but simply that they are barred by the provisions of
the ¥rCA. The practical effect ... is the same as if Congress had included it as an exemption
under section 2680.").
43. See generally Laird, 406 U.S. at 800 ("the presently prevailing view as to the theory
of liability for blasting damage is frankly conceded to be strict liability for undertaking an
ultrahazardous activity.... ").
44. See Lively v. United States, 870 F.2d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of
strict liability claim for asbestos sale; "it is clear that strict liability 'no fault' claims are not
cognizable under the ¥rCA ").
45. See Miller v. United States, 463 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal;
"because the exclusivevehicle for recovery against a dramshop in Utah is governed by a strict
liability statute under which the plaintiff need not establish negligence, such action is not
within the scope of the ¥reA\; immunity waiver").
46. See In re Bomb Disaster at Roseville, 438 F. Supp. 769, 771 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (barring
strict liability and § 402A claims arising from explosion of eighteen boxcars carrying govern-
ment bombs). See also In re All Maine Asbestos Litig., 581 F. Supp. 963,972 (D. Me. 1984):
There is no doubt that the Maine statute upon which Count IT is based, 14 M.R.S.A. § 221
(1980), is a strict liability statute. Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 934-44 (Me.
1982). See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) and Comment a. Consequently,
Count IT does not state a claim over which this Court has jurisdiction under the ¥reA.
For the FTCA to apply, the "negligent or wrongful act or omission"
must be that of an "employee of the Government."47 Accordingly, the
FTCA does not cover the torts of employees of the District of Columbia,48
territorial governments,49 or the fiancee of a VA physician house-hunting
in a new city.50
Nor, as a general matter, does the FTCA apply to torts of government
contractors.51 The Supreme Court recognized in Logue v. United States,52
where a federal prisoner committed suicide while housed in a county jail,
that a contractor may be deemed a federal employee if the government
controls the detailed physical aspects of its operations.53The Court held
that the contractor exclusion applied in Logue because the United States
had "no authority to physically supervise the conduct of the jail's employ-
ees," although the contract required the county to follow the Bureau of
Prisons' "standards of treatment for federal prisoners, including methods
of discipline, rules for communicating with attorneys, visitation privileges,
mail, medical services, and employment .... "54In some jurisdictions, the
United States may be liable for the torts of a contractor if the claim is based
on a nondelegable duty.55
47. 28 U.S.c. § 2671. The FrCA defines "Employee of the government" to include
(1) officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of
the United States, members of the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under
section 115, 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of title 32, and persons acting on behalf of a federal
agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United
States, whether with or without compensation, and
(2) any officer or employee of a Federal public defender organization, except when such of-
ficer or employee performs professional services in the course of providing representation
under section 3006A of title 18.
48. Cannon v. United States, 645 F.2d 1128, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
49. Harrisv. Boreham, 233 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1956) (finding that a maintenance super-
visor in the Virgin Islands is not a government employee under the FrCA).
50. Brandes v. United States, 783 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1986), revg 569 F. Supp. 538, 543
(N.D. Cal. 1983).
51. The FrCA defines the term "Federal agency" as including "the executive depart-
ments, the judicial and legislative branches, the military departments, independent establish-
ments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies
of the United States, but doesnot include any contractor with the United States." 28 U.S.c. § 2671
(emphasis added).
52. 412 U.S. 521 (1973). See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976) (holding com-
munity service agency was not a federal agency even though it received federal funding and
complied with federal regulations).
53. Logue, 412 U.S. at 527.
54. /d. at 530. In both Orkans and Logue the Supreme Court cited the RESTATEMENT(SEC-
OND)OFAGENCY§ 2 (1958). Orkans, 425 U.S. at 815, n.4; Logue, 412 U.S. at 528 n.5.
55. Compare Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1582-84 (11th Cir. 1989)
(deciding that the United States was liable under the FrCA for negligent transport of PCBs
by a contractor because Florida law imposed a nondelegable duty), with Roditis v. United
States, 122 F.3d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (dismissing FrCA claim of plaintiff
who fell on a post office construction site maintained by a contractor because the New York
nondelegable duty to maintain premises would be a form of strict liability).
Since the juri~dictional grant limits the waiver of sovereign immunity to
torts of federal employees "acting within the scope of [their] office or em-
ployment," the ITCA does not apply to acts or omissions that are outside
the scope of employment. 56Whether a federal employee is acting within
the scope of employment turns on the respondeat superior law of the state
in which the wrongful act or omission occurred.57 This brings into play
the common issues of state law regarding respondeat superior liability, in-
cluding whether the act was incidental to the employee's responsibilities,5s
was intended to further the employer's interests,59 or was within the time
and space limits of the employment.6o It also involves special issues such
as frolic and detour,61the going and coming rule,62and the special mission
rule.63
56. 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(I).
57. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam) ("This case is controlled
by the California doctrine of respondeat superior."), vacating 215 F.2d 800, 808 (9th Cir.
1954) (affirming dismissal because negligent acts of a soldier while off duty and off base were
outside military line of duty).
58. See, e.g., Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 662, 664-66
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding that a congressman's phone interview with a reporter
from a newspaper in his home district discussing his marriage in which he referred to plaintiff
as a "fundraising arm for Hezbollah" was incidental to his responsibilities); Meridian Int'l Lo-
gistics, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (finding
that FBI agent was acting in a way that was "broadly incidental" to his employment when he
made allegedly tortious statements about plaintiff).
59. See, e.g., Taboas v.Mlynczak, 149 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant's al-
legedly defamatory statements about Taboas's mental stability were motivated, at least in part,
by employer's interest in maintaining a safe workplace); Aversav. United States, 99 F.3d 1200
(1st Cir. 1996) (finding that assistant U.S. attorney's allegedly tortious statements regarding
plaintiff's involvement in a money-laundering scheme were intended, at least in part, to fur-
ther the Department ofJustice's interests).
60. See, e.g., Tonelli v.United States, 60 F.3d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 1995) (fmding that a postal
worker who opened and photocopied plaintiffs' adult-oriented mail was not acting within the
time and space of his employment); Vollendorffv. United States, 951 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that Army pilot who kept government-required medication in his home, which was
subsequently ingested by a child, causing permanent damage, was acting within the time and
space of his employment).
61. See, e.g., Miderv. United States, 322 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding two soldiers
were on a frolic; "They took the government vehicle to go to Abner's home for an entirely
personal weekend frolic, and became intoxicated on the way, and, before the collision which
occurred fifty-five miles from the Base.").
62. See, e.g., Clamor v. United States, 240 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Navy
civilian employee leaving work for the day when his car hit the plaintiff's was not acting
within the scope ofhis employment under the ITCA); Arnold v. United States, 39 F.3d 1175
(4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (finding that an Army sergeant was not acting
within the scope of his employment when he was driving his own car after leaving work for
the day).
63. See, e.g., Smollen v. United States, 46 F.3d 65 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that although
Department of Energy employee was in Houston on a special mission generally, he was not
acting within the scope of his employment when his car hit a pedestrian after a personal
meeting).
The jurisdictional grant applies only to wrongful acts or omissions
"under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred."64 Thus, Congress did not create new causes
of action when it enacted the ITCA.65 Rather, the act incorporates the
existing and evolving tort law of the states.66Moreover, the United States'
liability is like that of a private person, not of a state or municipality.67This
means that there is no ITCA subject-matter jurisdiction unless the case
involves a tort under state law.68If there is no actionable duty under state
law against a private person, there can be no tort claim against the United
States.69Accordingly, if private parties do not engage in analogous activity,
there is no analogous private person liability, and the waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply.70Likewise, if a private person cannot be sued in
tort for violation of a federal statute or regulation, then the government
cannot be sued in tort for such a violation. 71
64. 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(1).
65. Feres v.United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950)("Its effect is to waive immunity from
recognized causes of action and was not to visit the Government with novel and unprec-
edented liabilities.").
66. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955) ("The broad and just pur-
pose which the statute was designed to effect was to compensate the victims of negligence in
the conduct of Governmental activities in circumstances like unto those in which a private
person would be liable.'l See also George w: Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort
World? 112 PENNST. L. REV.175,247 (2007) (discussing the swine flu campaign, and stating
that " the Federal Tort Claims Act retains vitality and that it incorporates the flexibility of
underlying state common law.... ").
67. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957) (holding United States is
liable to the same extent as a private person for negligence pertaining to forest fires). But
see Chelsea Sage Durkin, Comment, How Strong Stands the Federal Tort Claims Act Wall? The
Effect of the Good Saman·tan and Negligence Per Se Doctrines on Governmental Tort Liability, 39
ARIZ.ST. L.J. 269, 274-79 (2007) (noting that the Ninth Circuit applies state law applicable
to municipalities and state officials in FTCA cases in which private parties do not engage in
analogous activity).
68. See, e.g., Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding that there is no subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff bank could not point to
any liability arising under California law); Williams v. United States, 242 F.3d 169 (4th Cir.
2001) (the United States is not liable for Native American hospital's failure to provide emer-
gency care to non-Indian because there was no duty to do so under state tort law).
69. See, e.g., Waltersv. United States, 474F.3d 1137, 1141 (11thCir. 2007) (finding that
the United States was not liable for an accident that occurred as a result of loose gravel on
a roadway because a private party would have no duty to prevent such a condition); Pate v.
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 374 F.3d 1081, 1084 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that there is no
analogous duty of private parties to insure that OSHA violations are abated).
70. See}ayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming
disInissalof suit by pajama manufacturers challenging ban on flame retardant; "quasi-legislative
or quasi-adjudicative action by an agency of the federal government is action of the type that
private persons could not engage in and hence could not be liable for under local law.Thus,
there is here no jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the federal government.").
71. In Art Metal-USA, Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the D.C.
Circuit affirmed dismissal of an action that alleged that the General Services Administration
On a more mundane level, any defense that is available under state
law to a private person defendant is available to the United States in an
¥rCA suit. These defenses include contributory negligence,72 compara-
tive negligence,73superseding cause,74assumption of risk,75recreational use
statutes,76and the statutory employer doctrine.77
The "private person liability" element is also the root of the Peres doc-
trine, which holds that "the Government is not liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of
negligently failed to follow its own procurement regulations when it refused to approve gov-
ernmental contracts with the plaintiff. The court held that violation of a federal statute or
regulation cannot form the basis of an ITCA suit: "[Ely basing its negligence claim entirely
on violation offederal duties, [plaintiff) fails to consider that the ITCA waives the immunity of
the United States only to the extent that a private person in like circumstances could be found
liable in tort under locallaw." Id. at 1157 (emphasis in original). See, e.g., Delta Sav. Bank, 265
F.3d at 1024-25 ("Plaintiffs suggest, without support, that an ITCA claim can be brought for
violations of federal statutes that provide private federal causes of action, even if there is no
analogous state law.This is not so.").
72. See, e.g., Kahn v.United States, 795 F. Supp. 473,476 (D.D.C. 1992)(finding contribu-
tory negligence where plaintiff stepped into Kennedy Center elevator car that was two feet
lower than the floor); Allnuttv. United States, 498 F. Supp. 832, 844 (WD. Mo. 1980) (finding
contributory negligence where pilot struck power line while flying below 100 feet); Craft v.
United States, 237 F. Supp. 717, 719 (D.S.C. 1965) (finding contributory negligence where
plaintiff sat on folding checkerboard table that collapsed).
73. See, e.g., Murffv. United States, 785 F.2d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1986)(barring suit where
airplane pilots' negligence exceeded that of air traffic controllers; "The Texas form of com-
parative negligence permits no recovery against one who is less negligent than the plaintiff.
See Article 2212a, TEX.REv.CIv. STAT.§ 1."); Yearyv. United States, 754 F. Supp. 546, 553
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (applying Michigan's pure comparative negligence standard in pedestri-
an-postal vehicle case, court reduced damages by forty percent); Walton v. United States,
484 F. Supp. 568, 576 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (applying Georgia comparative negligence standard
in lost burial vault case, court granted no recovery because plaintiff's fault exceeded govern-
ment's).
74. Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 962, 971 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (finding for
United States because superseding negligence of airplane pilot caused crash).
75. See, e.g., Clem v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 835, 845 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (applying Indi-
ana "incurred risk doctrine" where swimmer entered unfamiliar waters after being informed
no lifeguard was present and the waters were hazardous); Mullins v. Blackwell, 283 F. Supp.
462,463 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (assumption of risk doctrine barred suit by federal prisoner struck
by baseball while spectator at game).
76. See, e.g., Matheny v. United States, 469 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
Indiana Recreational Use Statute foreclosed recovery ftom a woman who was injured by a
protruding pipe while sled-riding in a national park); Wilson v. United States, 989 F.2d 953
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Missouri Recreational Use Statute protected the United
States from liability for a Boy Scout's death while on government-owned lands).
77. See, e.g., Vega-Mena v. United States, 990 F.2d 684 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that the
United States was the plaintiff's statutory employer under the Puerto Rico Workman's Com-
pensation Act, meaning that the United States was not liable in tort for injuries the plaintiff
sustained after falling into a vat of diesel fuel waste); Leigh v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space
Admin., 860 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Louisiana statutory employer doctrine
protected the United States from liability for injuries employee of a subcontractor sustained
while testing the external tank of the space shuttle).
or are in the course of activity incident to service."78In Feres, the Supreme
Court examined the ITCA and concluded that Congress had not intended
to waive sovereign immunity for injuries that arise incident to military ser-
vice,79The Court explained, "We do not think that Congress, in drafting
this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-
connected injuries or death due to negligence."80
Whether Feres applies to a particular claim turns on whether the injury
arose incident to military service.81In determining that issue, courts con-
sider a variety of factors, with no single one being dispositive. Important
factors in resolving whether an injury arose incident to service include the
following: whether the injury arose while a service member was on active
dutyj8z whether the injury arose on a military situsi83whether the injury
78. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950). The Court explained:
One obvious shortcoming in these claims is that plaintiffs can point to no liability of a
"private individual" even remotely analogous to that which they are asserting against the
United States. We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover
for negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is serving.
79. Id. at 146.
80. Id. In the Feres opinion, the Court discussed three rationales for the proposition that,
when it enacted the ITCA, Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity for suits
by servicemen against the United States: (1) the absence of private person liability, id. at 141;
(2) the availability of a separate, uniform, comprehensive, no-fault compensation scheme to
military personnel, id. at 145; and (3) the distinctly federal relationship between the govern-
ment and members of the armed forces, and the corresponding unfairness of permitting ser-
vice incident claims to be determined by non-uniform local law, id. at 142-44.
In United States v. Johnson, 481 U.s. 681, 691 (1987), the Court explained that the Feres
doctrine also furthers military discipline: "Moreover, military discipline involves not only
obedience to orders, but more general1yduty and loyalty to one's service and to one's country.
Suits brought by service members against the Government for service-related injuries could
undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to dis-
rupt military discipline .... "
81. A second, much less frequently used body of Feres jurisprudence arises from the deci-
sion in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (Army private kidnapped and murdered
by another private who had been convicted of manslaughter but retained in the service). It
bars ITCA suits brought for injuries to service members that are "the type of claims that,
if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense
of military discipline and effectiveness." Id. at 59. It applies to claims such as those that go
"directly to the 'management' of the military; [that) cal1into question basic choices about the
discipline, supervision and control of a serviceman." !d. at 58. The test here does not focus on
the injured service member, but on the nature of the chal1enged activity.
82. See Chambers v.United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966) (barring claim under Feres
because of claimant's active-duty status and presence on base, even though engaged in off-
duty recreation).
83. See Moreyv. United States, 903 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1990) (sailor falling off pier on return
to ship was Feres barred); Mil1ang v. United States, 817 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1987) (off-duty
marine run over by on-duty MP on military instal1ation was Feres barred). But see Dreier v.
United States, 106 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1996), where Feres did not bar suit when an active-duty
soldier visiting an on-base recreational area during his off-duty hours fel1 into the facility's
drainage channel and drowned. The court reasoned that, "though Drier's presence on the
arose during a military activity;84whether the service member was tak-
ing advantage of a privilege or enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of
military service when the injury arose;85and whether the injury arose while
the service member was subject to military discipline or controJ.86If the
injury arose out of an activity incident to service, suit is barred regardless
of whether the claim is filed for the injuries to the U.S. service member,87
for injuries to a foreign service member,88for loss of consortium by the ser-
vice member's spouse,89or on a third-party indemnity against the United
States for payments made to an injured service member.90 By the same
token, Peres does not bar a serviceman from suing for injuries to a spouse
or family member so long as those injuries were not incurred "incident to
service."91
base at the time of his death weighs in favor of a Feres bar, ... the situs of his injury is not
determinative." [d. at 852. Dreier is inconsistent with the weight of authority.
84. See Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863 (9th Cir 2001) (Feres barred suit by family
members of sailors who drowned while participating in Navy-led recreational rafting trip);
Galligan v City of Philadelphia, 156 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (West Point cadet in-
jured while watching Army-Navy football game was Feres barred).
85. See Quintana v. United States, 997 F.2d 711 (10th Cir. 1993) (Feres barred medical
malpractice claim by National Guard member who was performing inactive duty for training
when she injured her knee and subsequently received medical treatment at Air Force hospital
while off duty); Herreman v.United States, 476 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1973) (soldier hitching ride
on military aircraft while on leave was Feres barred).
86. See Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (Army serviceman's claim
for injuries sustained when he was ejected from on-base social club was Feres barred because
the club was under the operational control of the base commander who had the authority to
deny servicemen entry into the club).
87. See DozIer v. United States, 869 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1989) (Feres barred claim for
wrongful death of soldier murdered in Army barracks); Ordahl v. United States, 601 F.
Supp. 96 (D. Mont. 1985) (Feres barred suit by serviceman who was struck in the eye by a
darr fired from fellow serviceman's blowgun while in Air Force barracks).
88. See Aketepe v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 731 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (Feres barred suit by
Turkish sailors injured when their destroyer was struck by live missiles fired from U.S. carrier
during naval exercise), aff'd on other grounds, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997); Daberkow v.
United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1978) (West German pilot killed while on training
flight).
89. See Skees v. United States, 107 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 1997) (Feres barred widow's loss of
consortium claim after Army failed to prevent husband's suicide); De Font v. United States,
453 F.2d 1239 (1st Cir. 1972) (Feres barred derivative claim from serviceman's widow for
mental anguish permitted under Puerto Rican law).
90. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (Feres barred govern-
ment contractor from seeking indemnity for damages paid to National Guard pilot injured
by life-egress system).
91. Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) (serviceman may recover for
wrongful death of civilian wife after treatment in military hospital); Costley v. United States,
181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950) (Feres does not bar claim for wrongful death of wife); Phillips v.
United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.c. 1981) (sailor and wife could recover for "wrongful
birth" of son).
In summary, unless a claim falls within the specific language of § 1346(b ),
it is excluded from the ITCA's general waiver of sovereign immunity.92 To
fall within the ITCA's waiver, a claim must
• be "against the United States"
• seek "money damages"
• "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death"
• "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission"
• "of any employee of the Government"
• "while acting within the scope of ... [federal] employment"
• "under circumstances where ... a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."93
Absent any of these elements, the claim cannot use the ITCA as a bridge
across the moat of sovereign immunity.
III. PREREQUISITES FOR SUIT UNDER
THE FTCA: STEPS TO BE TAKEN BEFORE
THE BRIDGE CAN BE CROSSED
Before an ITCA suit can be filed in court on a claim that meets all the ele-
ments of § 1346(b), the claimant must first comply with the procedural re-
quirements of the statute. In a sense, these preconditions are akin to those
for using a castle's drawbridge; if the bridge keeper lets down the bridge
only in daytime or for those who have the password, no one can cross it at
night without the password. The ITCA bridge across the moat of sover-
eign immunity cannot be used unless the statute's prerequisites are met.
The first ITCA prerequisite is for the claimant to exhaust the admin-
istrative remedies created by the Act. The Act provides, "[a]n action shall
not be instituted ... unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim
to the appropriate Federal agency .... "94To meet the presentation require-
ment, the claimant must at least file an administrative claim in writing95
with the "appropriate Federal agency"96 that states a sum certain of the
92. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994).
93. 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b).
94. /d. § 2675(a).
95. [d. § 2401(b). See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281 (1st Cir. 2002) (barring
childbirth negligence suit under ITCA for failure to file administrative claim even though
plaintiff did not know that employees of federally supported health center were deemed to be
federal employees for ITCA purposes).
96. 28 U.S.c. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). See, e.g., Hart v. Dep't of Labor ex rei. United States,
116 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim because the completed
administrative claim was filed on the last day of the limitations period with the attorney gen-
eral rather than the Deparment of Labor).
damages suffered97 and identifies the conduct involved.98 More informa-
tion may be required in some circuits.99
Suit can be filed once the agency either denies the claim "in writing" or
fails to dispose of it "within six months after it is filed.... "100 In McNeil v.
United States, where a pro se plaintiff filed suit four months before filing
his administrative claim, the Supreme Court unanimously held that "The
¥rCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have
exhausted their administrative remedies."lol As a consequence, there can be
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b); Millares Guiraldes de Tmeo v. United States, 137 F.3d 715,
720 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that purported adIninistrative claim of DEA informant who had
been incarcerated in Chile "failed to meet the FrCAS requirements because it did not men-
tion any specific sum of money").
98. See, e.g., Tidd v. United States, 786 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1986) (barring suit arising
from "swine flu vaccination received on October 21,1976, in Jefferson County, Alabama,"
where administrative claim "designated the 'accident' as having occurred in Maylene, Ala-
bama, on December 5, 1976 .... ").
99. There is a split of authority as to whether an administrative claim must provide enough
information to support settlement negotiations. The FrCA authorizes the attorney general
to prescribe implementing regulations. 28 U.S.c. § 2672. Those regulations are set forth
at 28 C.F.R. § 14.2. "Under this regulation a 'claim' has four elements: (i) notification of the
incident; (ii) a demand for a sum certain; (iii) the title or capacity of the person signing; and
(iv) evidence of this person's authority to represent the claimant." Kanar v. United States, 118
F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir. 1997).
The Seventh Circuit requires compliance with the regulations. In Konar, the issue was
whether the adIuinistrative claim requirement was met where Long, the claimant's attorney,
failed to give the agency evidence of his authority to represent the claimant when requested
to do so. The court affirmed dismissal on grounds that the claim was invalid, even though
it identified the tortious conduct and stated a sum certain, reasoning that the agency's deci-
sion to close the file was "a reasonable response to the disdain of a reasonable request. As a
result, the settlement process that Congress created as a prelude to litigation (seeMcNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993).) was thwarted. Long's omission was not harmless; it scotched the
process." [d. at 531 (emphasis added).
The Eleventh Circuit requires less:
A proper notice of claim under the statute occurs where the claimant "(1) gives the agency
written notice of his or her claim sufficient to enable the agency to investigate and (2) places
a value on his or her claim." ... Once that prerequisite has been complied with, any further
obligation on the part of a claimant ceases. Although a claimant has an obligation to give
notice of a claim under § 2675, he or she does not have an obligation to provide further
information to assist settlement of the matter.
Ttdd, 786 F.2d at 1567 (citing Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir.), clarified
on reh'g, 622 F.2d 197 (1980) (emphasis by court». See generally Farmers State Sav. Bank v.
Farmers Home Admin., 866 F.2d 276, 277 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing cases).
The government has a special form for federal tort claims, SF-95, although its use is not
mandatory. Williams v. United States, 693 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1982).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
101. 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). The Court reasoned:
The most natural reading of the statute indicates that Congress intended to require com-
plete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process. Every
premature filing of an action under the FrCA imposes some burden on the judicial system
and on the Department of]ustice which must assume the defense of such actions. Although
no class action suits under the FTCA unless all the class participants have
filed administrative claims and had them denied.lo2
A second prerequisite is that suit be filed within both of the FTCA's two
statutes of limitations. One requires that the administrative claim be pre-
sented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years after
the claim accrues.103A claim accrues when the claimant is "in possession of
the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury."l04
Accrual is not delayed until the claimant knows that there was tortious
conduct.lo5 State law tolling doctrines such as those for infancyl06or in-
competencyl07do not apply to the FTCA statutes of limitations. It appears
that the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply to FTCA cases.108
the burden may be slight in an individual case, the statute governs the processing of a vast
multitude of claims. The interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation is best
served by adherence to the straightforward statutory command.
!d. at 112 (footnote omitted).
102. See, e.g., Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977) (affirming dismissal
of unnamed persons in class action suit for failure to file an administrative claim follow-
ing flood that resulted from cloud seeding). See also Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d
1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (requiring compliance with sum certain requirement in suit aris-
ing from execution of warrants regarding custody of Cuban child-refugee Elian Gonzalez;
"because each claimant must independently satisfy the prerequisite for filing suit under the
ITCA by providing a sum certain claim, ... the other ninety-seven claimants who filed a sum
certain claim do not satisfy the statutory prerequisite for the [four) dismissed plaintiffs who
omitted a sum certain in their claims.").
103. 28 U.S.C. §2401(b). See, e.g., Garrettv. United States, 640 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1981)
(holding claim for wrongful death of prisoner accrued on day he died, not on day Bureau of
Prisons released autopsy report).
104. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (medical malpractice); see also
Indus. Constructors Corp. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting argument that filing claim would have been futile).
105. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123-24.
106. MacMillan v. United States, 46 FJd 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1995) ("under the ITCA, the
limitations period is not tolled during the minority of the putative plaintiff; rather 'his parent's
knowledge of the injuries is imputed to him''') (citing Zavala v. United States, 876 F.2d 780,
782 (9th Cir. 1989».
107. Chomic V. United States, 377 FJd 607, 615 (6th Cir. 2004) ("courts have uniformly
held that mental incompetency, standing alone, will not toll the running of the statute of
limitations under the ITCA").
108. See JAYSON& LONGSTRETH,mpra note 5, § 14.01[2). Some courts have held that eq-
uitable tolling is applicable to the ITCA. See, e.g., Glamerv. United States, 30 F.3d 697, 702
(6th Cir. 1994) (applying equitable tolling because the VA did not give a veteran the form he
requested); Hughes V. United States, 263 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying equitable
tolling and placing statute of limitations burden of proof on United States). The subsequent
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Beggedy, 524 U.S. 38 (1998), undermines those
decisions. In Beggedy the Court explained:
Equitable tolling is not permissible where it is inconsistent with the text of the relevant stat-
ute .... Here, the QTA [Quiet Title Act], by providing that the statute of limitations will
not begin to run until the plaintiff "knew or should have known of the claim of the United
States," has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling .... Given this fact, and the
The second ITCA statute of limitations requires that suit be filed within
six months of the denial of the administrative claim.109
A third prerequisite is that suit be filed in the right court. Only federal
district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over ITCA cases.110Venue
is proper only in a federal district where "plaintiff resides or wherein the
act or omission complained of occurred."111The ITCA venue provision
can be waived.112
If all of these prerequisites are met, and the claim meets all the ele-
ments of § 1346(b)'s grant of jurisdiction, the ITCA's bridge is open to
it.l13\Vhether the claim can cross the bridge depends upon whether it falls
within any of the holes Congress placed in the ITCA's general waiver of
sovereign immunity.
Iv. STATUTORY BARS TO SUIT: THE CHECKERBOARD
NATURE OF THE FTCA BRIDGE
Congress's authority to waive sovereign immunity for suits in tort includes
the power to limit that waiver.114\Vhen it enacted the ITCA, Congress in-
cluded explicit exceptions for several categories of claims from the statute's
general waiver of sovereign immunity.ll5 These exceptions are, effectively,
unusually generous nature of the QTA's limitations time period, extension of the statutory
period by additional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.
/d. at 48-49 (internal citations omitted). The ITCA likewise delays accrual until the plaintiff
knows of the injury and its cause. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122. See also McIntyre v. United
States, 367 F.3d 38, 61, n.8 (1st Cir. 2004) (interpreting Beggedy as "holding that equitable
tolling does not apply to actions under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, for reasons
that could also apply to the ITCA").
109. 28 US.C. § 240 1(b); Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1983) (suit barred
by six-month limitations period even though suit filed less than two years after auto accident).
See generally McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Whisnat v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the ITCA confers subject matter jurisdiction on federal district courts to
hear tort actions against the government for the negligence of its employees) (citing 28
U.S.c. § 1346(b».
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b);Reuberv. United States, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirm-
ing dismissal of ITCA claim because the plaintiff was a resident of Maryland, which is also
where the alleged tortious act occurred, and plaintiff could point to no act or omission in the
District of Columbia, where plaintiff filed suit).
112. See Upchurch v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 736 F.2d 439, 440 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding
United States waived venue objection by not including it in answer).
113. An ITCAsuit "shall be tried by the court without a jury.... " 28 U.S.c. § 2402.
114. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (stating that courts should not extend
the waiver of sovereign immunity beyond that which Congress intended). See also LM ex rei.
KM v. United States, 344 F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the ITCA creates a
broad waiver of sovereign immunity, but it is limited by the statutory exceptions).
115. These exceptions are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (stating, "The provisions of
this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall not apply to-[listed claims]."
holes in the ITCA bridge; where an ITCA exception applies, the claim is
barred.1I6 Congress has enacted other laws that explicitly bar suit or have
been interpreted to bar claims that might otherwise fall under the ¥rCA.
These statutes put more holes in the bridge. 117
A Exceptions in the 'Text of the FTCA
The first exception included in the ITCA is the due care exception of
§2680(a). It applies to "[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an em-
ployee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a stat-
ute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid.... "118
This provision prohibits "tests by tort action of the legality of statutes and
regulations." 11 9 It applies when (1) a "federal statute, regulation, or policy
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow" and
(2) the employee uses "due care" in executing the statute or regulation. 120 In
practice, it blocks tort suits that question a government action, taken with
due care, that is authorized by a statute or regulation.l21 Accordingly, the
due care exception bars ITCA suits such as those challenging an agency's
interpretation of benefits available under its regulations122 or its decision to
release documents under the Freedom ofInformation Act.123
116. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32 (1953) ("One only need read § 2680 in
its entirety to conclude that Congress exercised care to protect the Government from claims,
however negligently caused, that affected the governmental functions."); Dolan v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 485 (2006) ("The ITCA qualifies its waiver of sovereign immunity for
certain categories of claims (13 in all). If one of the exceptions applies, the bar of sovereign
immunity remains. ").
117. I illustrate this to my audience by cutting a piece off the bridge of my cardboard castle
as I discuss each exception.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
119. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 33. The Court explained:
It was not "intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regulations, or
the propriety of a discretionary administrative act, should be tested through the medium of
a damage suit for tort. The same holds true of other administrative action not of a regula-
tory nature, such as the expenditure of Federal funds, the execution of a Federal project
and the like."
!d. at 27 (quoting from Hearings on HR 5373 and HR 6463, supra note 15, at 6, 25, 33 (State-
ment by the then Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea».
120. Crumpton v. Stone, 59 F.3d 1400, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (barring suit by widow of
military officer who alleged Army negligently released information about her and her family
pursuant to FOIA request).
12!. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 409 E3d 646, 652 (4th Cir. 2005) (barring suit by im-
migrant held in custody for 422 days under a statute later declared unconstitutional as applied
to him). See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 5, § 12.03 [text at n.!.].
122. See Baiev. Sec'y of Def., 784 E2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We also agree with the
district court that whether the Assistant Secretary's administrative interpretation of CHAM-
PUS excluding penile implants from the statute as 'prosthetic devices' was arbitrary or con-
trary to law may not be tested in an action under the ITCA.").
123. See Crumpton, 59 F.3d at 1403.
Asecond exception contained in §2680( a),prohibits" [a]ny claim ... based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."124This
is the discretionary function exception, often considered the most important
FICA exception.125The discretion protected by the exception, the discre-
tion to exercise judgment, has roots deep in American jurisprudence.126
Two elements must be met under the discretionary function exception.
First, a government action must '''involv[e] an element of judgment or
choice.'''127There can be no judgment or choice if a "'federal statute, regu-
lation or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow.'''128Second, the required judgment must involve social, economic,
or political policy, the sort of judgments the exception was intended to
protect.129This test is met if the actions taken are "susceptible to policy
analysis," regardless of whether the employee consciously made a policy
determination.IJO Nor does it matter whether the decision was made at
124. 28 U.S.c. § 2680(a).
125. Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial
Independence, 35 GEO.WASH. INT'LL. REV.521 (2003) ("Of [the FICA exceptions], the most
important is the 'discretionary function' exception."); Mark C. Niles, "Nothing but Mischief":
The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN.L. REV.1275
(2002) (arguing that the judicial interpretation of the discretionary function exception broad-
ens the scope of sovereign immunity).
126. The Supreme Court explained:
The "discretion" protected by the section is not that of the judge-a power to decide within
the limits of positive rules oflaw subject to judicial review. It is the discretion of the execu-
tive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of the best course, a concept of
substantial historical ancestry in American law.
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 170 (1803); Spalding v.Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1895); Alzua v.Johnson, 231 U.S. 106
(1913); Louisiana v.McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 633 (1914); Perkins v.Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113, 131 (1940)).
127. Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486
U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
128. /d.
129. Id. at 322-23. The Court explained:
Furthermore, even "assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment," it
remains to be decided "whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield." Ibid. See Vilrig Airlines, 467 U.S., at 813. Because the
purpose of the exception is to "prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and admin-
istrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium
of an action in tort," id., at 814, when properly construed, the exception "protects only
governmental as;tions and decisions based on considerations of public policy." Berkovitz,
supra, at 537.
/d.
130. Id. at 324-25:
For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must allege facts which would support
a finding that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be
the planning or operational level.131"It is the nature of the conduct, rather
than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary func-
tion exception applies.... "132Because the exception, by its terms, is ap-
plicable "whether or not the discretion involved be abused,"133when its
elements are met, it bars claims arising from flawed policies or negligent
conduct. 134
The discretionary function exception applies to a broad range of deci-
sions. The Supreme Court has found it bars suits alleging that the fire
that destroyed Texas City was the result of negligence in the program to
send fertilizer to postwar Europe,135that airplanes crashed because the
Federal Aviation Administration delegated safety inspections,136and that a
bank failed because of poor "day-to-day" decisions made by government-
appointed bank managers.137The exception bars suits arising from broad
decisions of nationwide import such as President Carter's determina-
tion to cancel wheat sales in retaliation for the Soviet Union's invasion
grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime. The focus of the inquiry is not on the
agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by stamte or regulation, but
on the namre of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.
As a consequence, a detailed facmal record is not required: Gaubert was resolved on a motion
to dismiss. !d. at 320.
131. /d. at 325 ("A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is noth-
ing in that description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions. ").
132. /d. at 322 (quoting United States v.Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984)).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
134. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,22-23,43 (1953); Domme v. United States,
61 F.3d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that the exception "does not apply
to 'mandatory common law duties'" to supervise contractor operating government-owned
national laboratories ); seealso infra note 136.
135. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 22-23, 43. The Supreme Court included in the appendix to its
decision the district court's findings of numerous "blunders, mistakes, and acts of negligence,
both of omission and commission, on the part of Defendant" in the fertilizer program. /d. at
45--46. The district court found negligence in the decisions to begin the program, continue
the program, use a material to coat the fertilizer, use paper bags for shipping, pack the fertil-
izer so it did not cool, not label it as an explosive, and not notify the carriers, the city, or the
state ofits dangers. Id. at 45--47.
136. VarigAirlines, 467 U.S. 797.
137. United States. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1991):
[Government-substimted bank officers] recommended the hiring of a certain consultant to
advise IASA on operational and financial matters; they advised IASA concerning whether,
when, and how its subsidiaries should be placed into bankruptcy; they mediated salary
disputes; they reviewed the draft of a complaint to be used in litigation; they urged IASA to
convert from state to federal charter; and they actively intervened when the Texas Savings
and Loan Department attempted to install a supervisory agent at IASA.
In Berkovitz, dte Court held the exception did not apply to a suit alleging that polio vaccine
was licensed for release to the public in contravention of mandatory agency regulations that
set specific scientific standards for that licensing. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,
546--47 (1988).
of Mghanistan,138President Reagan's decision to order missile strikes on
Tripoli and Benghazi in response to acts of terrorism instigated by the
Libyan government,139and the FDA commissioner's order prohibiting im-
portation of Chilean grapes even though the order was based on allegedly
negligent laboratory work. 140It also bars claims for smaller, everyday events
such as falling trees (if forestry officials have discretion to determine what
inspections to conduct),141the sale of used motor vehicles "as-is" (if the
terms of sale involve policy considerations),142or moose-snowmobile ac-
cidents at national parks (if moose management involves balancing policy
considerations). 143
The next exception is more straightforward. The postal exception of
§ 2680(b) bars suit for "any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or
negligent transmission of letters or postal matter."I44 It applies only to
claims relating to the transmittal of the mails. It allows the government
to be sued for torts tangentially related to mail transmittal, such as leaving
mail where it can cause a slip and fall,145negligently driving postal trucks, 146
or surreptitiously reading the mail.l47The postal exception bars suits for
late deliveries,148lost items,149and stolen mail containing incredibly valu-
able works of art created by the sender.150
138. Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
139. Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'g in relevant part and rev'g in
part 702 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990), op. after remand, reh'g
denied, sub nom. Saltany v. Bush, 960 F.2d 1060 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Clark v.
Thatcher, 506 U.S. 956 (1992).
140. Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v.United States, 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir.) (alleging that laboratory
negligently concluded that sample grapes contained poison), cert. denied sub nom. Balmaceda,
Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 806 (1995).
141. Auteryv. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1993) (barring suit where black
locust fell on decedent's car while he drove through Great Smoky Mountain National Park).
142. Myslakowski v. United States, 806 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1986) (barring suit for failure
to warn arising from vehicle rollover where sale of used postal vehicles "as-is-where-is" "in-
cluded, inferentially, no test driving, no mechanical inspection, no refurbishing or recondi-
tioning, no express warranties, and certainly no warnings").
143. Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is irrelevant
whether Ranger Phillips directed plaintiffs into danger .... Even if discretion is exercised neg-
ligently, the exception can ... shield the government from liability. The relevant inquiry is
whether Ranger Phillips was exercising discretion grounded in public policy when he directed
plaintiffs around the moose.") (citation omitted).
144. 28 U.S.c. § 2680(b).
145. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006).
146. See generally id. at 487-88.
147. Cruikshankv. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355, 1360 (D. Haw. 1977).
148. See Riderv. U.S. Postal Serv., 862 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1988) (political mail deliv-
ered too late to be used).
149. See Georgacarakos v. United States, 420 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2005) (barring suit by
prisoner for loss of sixteen of twenty-three books mailed together in a box).
150. In Anderson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 761 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1985), plaintiff, a com-
poser, mailed some of his original compositions to himself and insured them for $100. When
The exception set forth at § 2680(c) blocks "claim[s] arising in respect
of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention
of ... property by any ... law enforcement officer .... "151The first clause
bars tort suits pertaining to taxes such as those alleging that a tax-sale was
mishandled,152 bank and retirement accounts were improperly attached, 153
or tax refunds were not properly paid.154 The second clause bars suit for
detention of goods, whether the claim is for a wrongful detention155 or for
his package was stolen, he brought suit for $800,000. Id. The court affirmed dismissal based
on the postal exception. Id.
The exception also has been applied to suits for transmittal of mail bombs. See Gager v.
United States, 149 FJd 918 (9th Cir. 1998) (mail bomb delivered to home of Nevada High-
way Patrol trooper).
151. The exception states:
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty,
or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or
excise or any other law enforcement officer, except that the provisions of this chapter [28
U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq.] and section 1346(b) of this title apply to any claim based on injury
or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property, while in the possession of any officer of
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, if-
(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federallaw
providing for the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction
of a criminal offense;
(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;
(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or mitigated (if the property was subject
to forfeiture); and
(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the interest of the claimant in the
property was subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law.. [sic]
28 U.S.C. §2680(c).
152. See Green v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1127-28 (D. Utah 2006).
153. See Weiner v. IRS, 986F.2d 12, 12-13 (2dCir. 1993).
154. See Aema Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 71 F.3d 475, 477-78 (2d Cir. 1995);
Chambers v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 601, 602 (D. Kan. 1952) (barring suit where liquor
belonging to wife was seized under search warrant against her husband and a "portion of the
liquor was missing when a court order was entered directing that it be returned to her'').
155. See United States v. $149,345 U.S. Currency, 747 F.2d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 1984).
The court explained:
The [claim] also falls outside the Federal Tort Claims Act because the alleged injury arises
from the detention of the money itself and the propriety of the detention is at issue. 28
U.S.C. § 2680(c) excludes from coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act claims for deten-
tion of goods or merchandise by law enforcement officers.... [T]here appears to be no
valid reason to treat a seizure of money differently from goods. The apparent intent of sec-
tion 2680(c) is to limit governmental liability for improper seizures and to restrict claimants
to the statutory procedures of the forfeiture laws.... These aims are just as important for
seizures of currency as for merchandise.
Id. (citations omitted).
loss or damage to detained goods.156The detention of goods clause applies
whenever any law enforcement officer (not just those enforcing customs or
excise laws) holds, ships, or stores detained goods.157
The three subsequent exceptions are straightforward and rarely liti-
gated. Section 2680(d) applies to claims that are cognizable under the Suits
in Admiralty Act or Public VesselsAct.158Section 2680(e) applies to claims
arising from the administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act.159
Section 2680(t) addresses "[a]ny claim for damages caused by the imposi-
tion or establishment of quarantine by the United States."160
The next provision, 161§2680(h), the intentional tort exception, is
special.162Generally speaking, it retains sovereign immunity for claims
arising from the eleven specific torts it names.163It bars claims for assault
or battery by federal employees and applies whether harm was intended,l64
156. Kosakv. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 862 (1984) ("the Tort Claims Act does not cover
suits alleging that customs officials injured property that had been detained by the Customs
Service").
157. See Aliv. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 522 U.S. 214 (2008) (barring suit by federal prisoner
who alleged his personal property was lost during transfer to another prison).
158. It bars "[a]ny claim for which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 or 311 of Title 46,
relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d).
159. It bars "[a]ny claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix." 28 U.S.c.
§ 2680(e).
160. 28 U.S.c. § 2680(f). Many of the cases that address the quarantine exception involve
agriculmre. See Reyv. United States, 484 E2d 45,46 (5th Gr. 1973) (barring suit where hogs
died from cholera vaccine after other hogs were quarantined with cholera); Saxton v. United
States, 456 E2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 1972) (barring claim that alleged "emotional injury from
the quarantining of samples taken from the [plaintiffs'] cattle").
161. Section 2680(g) was repealed. Sept. 26,1950, ch. 1049, § 13(5),64 Stat. 1043.
162. Because it is special, when I cut its avatar from the bridge, I give that piece of card-
board to someone in the audience.
163. It bars "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, ma-
licious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights .... " 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h).
Throughout the FTCA, the meaning of a legal term is what Congress intended and is not
dependent on state law.See United States v.Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 705-06 (1961) ("Whether
or not this analysis [of 'misrepresentation'] accords with the law of States which have seen fit
to allow recovery under analogous circumstances, it does not meet the question of whether
this claim is outside the intended scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which depends solely
upon what Congress meant by the language it used in § 2680(h)."); Dryv. United States, 235
F.3d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000)("The definitionofa term used in the FTCA'is by definition
a federal question.' "), citing Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992) (interpreting
"punitive damages" language of28 U.S.C. § 2674).
164. See Turner v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 708, 709 (WD. La. 1984) (barring suit
where military recruiter "deceived four ... adult women, into believing that in order to join
the [National] Guard, they had to submit to complete physical examinations conducted on
the spot by him as the recruiter .... ").
a joke ran afoul,165or plaintiff characterizes the act as negligent.166The
assault and battery exception does not apply to claims for medical malprac-
tice.167Nor does it apply if acts of other government employees give rise
to a separate cause of action. In Sheridan v. United States, where a patient
at Bethesda Naval Hospital fired a gun at passing motorists, the Supreme
Court explained that "the negligence of other Government employees who
allowed a foreseeable assault and battery to occur may furnish a basis for
Government liability.... "168
Section 2680(h) also bars claims for false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. Prior to 1974, these excep-
tions, and the assault and battery exception, were important in suits al-
leging wrongdoing by federal law enforcement officials.169Congress
determined that the ¥rCA should provide a remedy for such tortS.170Ac-
cordingly, it amended § 2680(h) by adding a proviso that voids the ¥rCA
exceptions for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and abuse of process for acts of federal law enforcement
165. See Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441,442 (2d Cir. 1976) (barring suit where
meat inspector "pulled plaintiff's wool stocking hat over his eyes and, climbing on his back,
began to ride him piggyback," causing his face to strike meat hooks).
166. See United States v.Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1964) (barring suit for injuries
from tear gas used by federal officials confronting a hostile crowd when James Meredith en-
tered the University of Mississippi; "Nor can plaintiff recover under the Tort Claims Act for
the 'negligent' firing on him by the group of marshals and Border Patrolmen.").
167. See Keir v. United States, 853 F.2d 398, 410-11 (6th Cir. 1988).
168. 487 U.S. 392,401 (1988). On remand, the case was dismissed because there was no
actionable duty under Maryland law. Sheridan v. United States, 969 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir.
1992), aff'g 773 F. Supp. 786 (D. Md. 1991).
169. See, e.g.,Jones v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 139 F. Supp. 38, 40-41 (D. Md. 1956)
(dismissing under § 2680(h) complaint that alleged FBI agents threatened plaintiff's "sick
wife and three little children for a period of 20 to 30 minutes," falsely imprisoned them and
plaintiff in an apartment, carried plaintiff away,and stole his property); Swanson v.Willis, 220
F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1955) (affirming dismissal of suit against a deputy U.S. marshall that alleged
false arrest and battery in the course of an arrest).
170. The Senate Report, S. REP.No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), as reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.CA-N. 2789, 2791, stated:
The effect of this provision is to deprive the Federal Government of the defense of sover-
eign immunity in cases in which Federal law enforcement agents, acting within the scope
of their employment, or under color of Federal law, commit any of the following torts:
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or abuse of process.
Thus, after the date of enactment of this measure, innocent individuals who are subjected
to raids of the type conducted in Collinsville, lllinois, will have a cause of action against the
individual Federal agents and the Federal Government.
The law enforcement proviso is an exception to the § 2680(h) exception to the FTCA's gen-
eral waiver of sovereign inununity. Accordingly, when I discuss the proviso, I request return
of the § 2680(h) avatar (see note 162, supra), cut off a portion of it, and put that portion back
on the bridge.
officers.17lSubsequently, there has been relatively little litigation involv-
ing the latter four exceptions, although they continue to apply to acts of
prosecutors and other federal employees who are not law enforcement
officers. 172
Section 2680(h) also bars claims for libel or slander, for misrepresen-
tation or deceit, and for interference with contract rights. The libel and
slander exception bars traditional claims for libel and slander!73and other
claims for which defamation is a necessary element.!74It does not bar claims
for invasion of privacy, except those based on false statements.!75
The misrepresentation exception applies when a plaintiff's injury arises
from its reliance on information communicated by the government. Two
Supreme Court cases delineate its scope. First, in United States v. Neustadt, !76
171. Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (Mar. 16, 1974), added the following language to
§ 2680(b):
Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement of-
ficers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b)
of this tide shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this pro-
viso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer"
means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to
seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federallaw.
172. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
prosecutors are not law enforcement officers; "Where, as here, the harm actually flows from
the prosecutor's exercise of discretion, an attempt to recharacterize the action as something
else must fail."); Wilson v. United States, 959 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding parole officers
are not law enforcement officers); Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1977)
(holding Post Exchange security employees are not law enforcement officers).
173. See Cooper v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 602, 613 (10th Cir. 1992) (barring claim
alleging that federal "employees negligently brought false information to the attention of
third parties"); Council on Am. Islamic Relations, Inc. v. Ballenger, 366 F. Supp. 2d 28,30,32
(D.D.C. 2005) (barring suit for congressman's statement, given in interview about his marital
problems, that characterized his neighbor "as the 'fund-raising arm for Hezbullah' ").
174. See Art Metal-USA, Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(rejecting argument that claim for injurious falsehood is not encompassed by the libel and
slander exception; "Art Metal's argument ... is based on an illusory distinction between its
interest in its reputation (which would be vindicated by a defamation action showing lost
profits) and its pecuniary interest in its products (which would be vindicated by an injurious
falsehood action requiring pecuniary harm).").
175. Compare Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that
§2680(b) did not bar invasion of privacy claim where CIA had opened and read plaintiff's mail;
"the tOftSof trespass and invasion of privacy do not fall within the exception of § 2680(b)"),
with Metz v. United States, 788 F2d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986):
[T]he government officials' allegedly slanderous statements are essential to Mr. Metz's ac-
tion for false light privacy and Ingrid Metz's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. at 297-99. There is no other governmental action upon
which these claims could rest. These claims, therefore, "arise out of' slander for the pur-
poses of § 2680(b) and are not actionable under the FTCA.
176. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
the purchaser of a house that had been appraised by the Federal Housing
Administration alleged that in reliance on the agency's negligent inspec-
tion and appraisal, he had paid a price above the fair market value.177The
Court held that regardless of whether the FHA was negligent or owed
plaintiff a '''specific duty' to obtain and communicate information care-
fully," the misrepresentation exception barred his claim because plaintiff's
injuries resulted from his reliance on the FHA's statement.178
In the second case, Block v. Neal,179 the plaintiff had obtained a loan from
the FHA for a prefabricated house. After plaintiff moved into the house,
she discovered defects she attributed to the FHA's negligence in super-
vising its construction.180The FHA argued that plaintiff's claim was one
of "misrepresentation" and, therefore, barred by § 2680(h).181The Court
rejected the argument, noting "the Government's misstatements are not
essential to plaintiff's negligence claim."182It held that the misrepresenta-
tion exception "does not bar negligence actions which focus not on the
Government's failure to use due care in communicating information, but
rather on the Government's breach of a different duty."183
The exception applies whether the misrepresentation is intentional184
or negligent.185It bars suit for both commerciallosses186 and personal in-
juries.187Because it is inapplicable when the government owes a separate
177. Id. at 700-01.
178. Id. at 710-11.
179. 460 U.S. 297 (1983).
180. Id. at 290.
181. Id. at 296.
182. Id. at 297.
183. Id. In Block the Court reaffirmed its Neustadt holding: "Neustadt alleged no injury
that he would have suffered independently of his reliance on the erroneous appraisal. Because
the alleged conduct that was the basis of his negligence claim was in essence a negligent
misrepresentation, Neustadt's action was barred under the 'misrepresentation' exception."
Id. at 296-97.
184. See Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 202 (9th Cir. 1988) (barring suit by swin-
dled investors where "[t]he gravamen of their complaint alleged that the CIA used BBRDW
[an investment company] as a cover for its operations; wrongfully permitted ... the firm pres-
ident, to defraud investors; and misrepresented that BBRDW was a legitimate company");
Redmond v. United States, 518 F.2d 811, 812 (7th Cir. 1975) (barring claims that agents and
operatives of the government permitted plaintiff to be defrauded by a "securities dealer" de-
scribed as a "highly competent confidence man working with government agents to recover
a stolen U.S. Treasury bond").
185. See United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 702 (1961) ("§ 2680(b) comprehends
claims arising out of negligent, as well as willful, misrepresentation.").
186. See Reamer v. United States, 459 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1972) (barring suit for misrepre-
sentation that law student could defer active duty until completion of semester if he enlisted,
resulting in monetary loss when he was ordered to active duty).
187. See Schneider v. United States, 936 F.2d 956,962 (7th Cir. 1991) (barring suit for
personal injury caused by consttuction defects in manufactured homes; "the government's
communication of its approval of Tri State's plans created the assurance that the plaintiffs
relied on to their detriment"); Bergquistv. United States, 849 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (N.D. 111.
duty, it does not bar suits arising from medical malpractice 188or faulty navi-
gational aids. 189
The exception for "interference with contract rights"l90 has been applied
to claims of interference with employment,191 debarment from government
contracts,l92 and seizure of assets.193It applies whether the interference is
caused by government conspiracyl94 or simple bureaucratic delay. 195
Section 2680(h) only applies to suits that arise from its listed intentional
torts. Accordingly, it does not bar torts such as trespass,196 conversion, 197
intentional infliction of emotional distress,198 or invasion of privaeyl99 so
long as none of the excepted torts is a necessary part of the claim.2°O The
Supreme Court, however, has rejected attempts to avoid the effect of the
§2680 exceptions by artful pleading, suggesting that the courts must "look
1994) (barring claim that the National Weather Service negligently issued tornado warnings);
Vaughn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 286, 287-88 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (barring claim where
construction crew relied on government map and unexpectedly struck gas pipeline).
188. See Beech v.United States, 345 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 1965);Phillips v.United States,
508 F. Supp. 544, 548 (D.S.C. 1981).
189. See Ingham v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 239 (2d Cir. 1967) (allowing suit where
air traffic controllers failed to provide accurate weather information).
190. The RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§ 766 (1977) identifies an action for "inducing
breach of contract or refusal to deal" as an act by someone not privileged to do so that "in-
duces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with another,
or (b) enter into or continue a business relation with another."
191. See Moessmerv. United States, 760 F.2d 236, 237 (8th Cir. 1985) (barring claim that
CIA pressured private firm to not hire former agency employee; "We hold that Moessmer's
claim for interference with prospective economic advantage is the equivalent of a claim for
interference with contract rights, and thus falls within the section 2680(h) exemption.").
192. See Art Metal-USA, Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
193. See United States v. Mullins, 228 F. Supp. 748, 750 (W.D. Va. 1964).
194. See Daisley v. Riggs Bank, N.A., 372 F. Supp. 2d 61,64 (D.D.C. 2005) (barring claim
that Treasury official and bank officer "conspired to orchestrate [plaintiff's] termination").
195. See Shapiro v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 886, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (barring claim of
former State Department attorney who "averred that the Government's negligence in provid-
ing a letter concerning his conflict of interest situation delayed the beginning of his associa-
tion with [a law firm].").
196. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 518, 526 (E.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (intoxicated seaman opened floodgate valves on
floating drydock).
197. Preston v. United States, 596 F.2d 232, 239-40 (7th Cir. 1979) (Commodity Credit
Corporation kept farmers' share of proceeds of grain sold from bankrupt warehouse).
198. Truman v.United States, 26 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994) (sexual harassment not involving
assault or battery); Gross v. United States, 676 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1982) (farmer unfairly
excluded from participating in Department of Agriculture feed grain program); Cruikshank v.
United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355,1360 (D. Haw. 1977) (opening plaintiff's mail).
199. Birnbaum v.United States, 588 F.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1978) (allowing invasion of pri-
vacy claim where CIA had opened and read plaintiff's mail; "the torts of trespass and invasion
of privacy do not fall within the exception of § 2680(h)").
200. See, e.g., Art Metal-USA, Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(rejecting argument that claim for injurious falsehood is not encompassed by the libel and
slander exception).
beyond the literal meaning of the language to ascertain the real cause of
complaint."201
Section 2680(i) deals with claims arising from fiscal operations and mon-
etary regulation.202It rarely comes up, though it has been applied to a pro
se plaintiff.203
The combatant activity exception of § 2680(j) bars all claims arising
from "combatant activities."204The term includes "not only physical vio-
lence, but activities both necessary to and in direct connection with actual
hostilities."205The exception applies regardless of whether there is a formal
declaration of war.206In Knohi, the Ninth Circuit applied the combatant
activities exception to bar suit when a U.S. warship mistakenly shot down
an Iranian civilian aircraft, noting that the exception is intended "to ensure
that the government will not be liable for negligent conduct by our armed
forces in times of combat. "207
The foreign tort exception of §2680(k) bars" claim[s]arising in a foreign
country." In its 2004 Sosa opinion, the Supreme Court held that the "for-
eign country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a for-
eign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred."208
In doing so it rejected a prior line of cases that allowed suit to proceed if
plaintiffs alleged that a tort in the United States caused the foreign in-
jury.209The exception applies whenever injury is suffered in foreign lands,
201. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 703 (1961); United States v. Shearer, 473
U.S. 52, 55 (1985) (plurality opinion; "[n]o semantical recasting of events can alter the fact
that the battery was the immediate cause of [the injury] and consequently, the basis of respon-
dent's claim").
202. It applies to "[a]ny claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury
or by the regulation of the monetary system."
203. See Forrester v. U.S. Gov't, 443 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
204. It applies to "claim[s] arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or Coast Guard, during time of war." 28 U.S.C. §26800).
205. SeeJohnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948) (holding exception did
not bar suit for pollution of U.S. coastal waters by warships after conclusion of World War II)
(quoted in Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1992».
206. See Clark v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 895, 898 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (Operation Desert
Storm), aff'd without published opinion, 116 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table deci-
sion); Koohi, 976 F.2d 1328 (1988 tanker war); Rotkov. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46, 47 (D. Conn.
1971) (Viemam), aff'd on basis of district court opinion, 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972).
207. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334 ("[I]t simply does not matter for purposes of the 'time of
war' exception whether the military makes or executes its decisions carefully or negligently,
properly or improperly. It is the nature of the act and not the manner of its performance that
counts.").
208. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (alleging that DEA improperly
procured the kidnapping of plaintiff so that he could be tried in the United States for com-
plicity in the torture and murder in Mexico of a DEA agent).
209. See id. at 709-12,752-54.
including injuries that arise at U.S embassies/IO on U.S. military bases,2l1
or in ungoverned regions.212
The three remaining exceptions are rarely litigated. They bar claims
arising from the activities of "the Tennessee Valley Authority,"213"the Pan-
ama Canal Company,"214or "a Cooperative Bank, a Federal Land Bank or
a Federal Intermediate Credit Bank."215
B. Statutes That Explicitly Bar Suit
A number of statutes preclude government liability under the FTCA for
various kinds of claims. Some create their own comprehensive systems
and explicitly prohibit any other judicial remedy. The Federal Employ-
ee's Compensation Act (FECA)216provides a comprehensive, workers'
compensation-type remedy for federal employees killed or injured on the
job that is exclusive217and bars any FTCA suit if a FECA remedy may be
available.218The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act also
210. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir. 1964) (barring claim arising at
U.S. embassy in Bangkok, Thailand: "There is nothing in the Federal Tort Claims Act which
indicates that it was intended to apply to personal or property damage sustained in our embas-
sies and consulates abroad.").
211. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949) (barring claim arising at U.S.
airfield in Newfoundland); Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996) (barring
claim by wife of serviceman for medical malpractice at the U.S. Naval Facility, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba).
212. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,201-05 (1993) (barring claim that arose in
Antarctica).
213. Section 2680(1) applies to "[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee
Valley Authority."
214. Section 2680(m) applies to "[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the Panama
Canal Company."
215. Section 2680(n) applies to "[a]ny claim arising from the activities of a Federal land
bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives."
216. 5 U.S.C.S. § 8101 et seq.
217. 5 U.S.c. § 8116(c):
The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof under this subchapter [5
U.S.c. §§ 8101 et seq.] or any extension thereof with respect to the injury or death of an
employee is exclusive and instead of all other liabiliry of the United States or the instru-
mentality to the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and
any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or the
instrumentality because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil
action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a workmen's
compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute.
218. Sw.Marine v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 90 (1991) ("FECA contains an 'unambiguous and
comprehensive' provision barring any judicial review of the Secretary of Labor's determina-
tion of FECA coverage .... Consequently, the courts have no jurisdiction over FTCA claims
where the Secretary determines that FECA applies.") (citations omitted); Grijalva v. United
States, 781 F.2d 472,474 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff who received FECA benefits
for injuries from auto accident "cannot now collaterally attack the Secretary's determination
of coverage in this Tort Claims Act suit").
provides an exclusive, workers' compensation remedy for, inter alia, em-
ployees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.219Similarly, there are
explicit provisions barring FTCA suits for the denial of Social Security,220
Medicare,221and veterans' program benefits.222
Other statutes explicitly bar specific categories of claims. Perhaps the
most important is the Flood Control Act of 1928, which provides, "No
liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any
damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.... "223The legisla-
tive history of the act shows that when Congress embarked on the national
flood control program, it "clearly sought to ensure beyond doubt that sov-
ereign immunity would protect the Government from 'any' liability associ-
ated with flood control."224In Central Green, the Supreme Court explained,
219. 5 U.S.c. § 8173 ("This liability is exclusive and instead of all other liability of
the United States ... in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judi-
cial proceeding under a workmen's compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability
statute. ").
220. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (h) ("Finality of Commissioner's decision .... No action against the
United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any officer or employee thereof shall
be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28, United States Code [the FTCA], to recover
on any claim arising under this title. ").
221. The Medicare statue incorporates the § 405(h) rule from the Social Security Act.
42 U.S.c. § 1395ii, "Application of certain provisions of title II [42 U.S.c. §§ 401 et seq.],"
states:
The provisions of sections 206 and 2160), and of subsections (a), (d), (e), (h), (i), 0), (k),
and (I) of section 205 [42 U.S.c. §§ 406, 4160), and 405(a), (d), (e), (h), (i), 0), (k), and (I)],
shall also apply with respect to this title [42 U.S.c. §§ 1395 et seq.] to the same extent as
they are applicable with respect to title II [42 U.S.c. §§ 401 et seq.], except that, in apply-
ing such provisions with respect to this title, any reference therein to the Commissioner of
Social Security or the Social Security Administration shall be considered a reference to the
Secretary or the Department of Health and Human Services, respectively.
222. 38U.S.C.§511:
§511. Decisions of the Secretary; finality
(a) The Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by
the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans
or the dependents or survivors of veterans. Subject to subsection (b), the decision of the
Secretary as to any such question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed
by any other official or by any court, whether by an action in the nature of mandamus or
otherwise.
223. 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
224. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 608 (1986) ("§ 702c's language ... and [t]he
equally broad and emphatic language found in the legislative history shows [sic] that Con-
gress understood what it was saying. We therefore conclude that the legislative history fully
supports attributing to the unambiguous words of the statute their ordinary meaning." (cit-
ing National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (8th Cir. 1954) ("The cost of the
flood control works itself would inevitably be very great and Congress plainly manifested its
will that those costs should not have the flood damages that will inevitably recur added to
them."))).
"the text of the statute directs us to determine the scope of the immunity
conferred, not by the character of the federal project or the purposes it
serves, but by the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage
and the purposes behind their release."225 Accordingly, the Flood Control
Act bars suit whenever floods or floodwaters that were or were not con-
tained in a flood control project allegedly cause personal injury, death,226
or property damage.227
Other statutes have similar explicit bars to suit. For example, 10 U.S.c.
§ 456 bars any claim "brought against the United States on the basis of
the content of a navigational aid prepared or disseminated by the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. "228The Panama Canal Act of 1979 bars
any suit against the United States or the Panama Canal Commission ex-
cept those involving ships in transit.229 The Prison Litigation Reform Act
limits the ability of current prisoners to sue for emotional injuries.230
225. Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 434 (2001).
226. James, 478 U.S. at 608.
227. See, e.g., Cent. Green Co., 531 U.S. 425; National Mfg., 210 F.2d 263.
228. 10 U.S.c. § 456:
§456. Civil actions barred
(a) Claims barred.-No civil action may be brought against the United States on the
basis of the content of a navigational aid prepared or disseminated by the National Geo-
spatial-Intelligence Agency.
(b) Navigational aids covered.-Subsection (a) applies with respect to a navigational aid
in the form of a map, a chart, or a publication and any other form or medium of product
or information in which the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency prepares or dissemi-
nates navigational aids.
See Hyundai Merch. Marine Co. v United States, 888 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 75
F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1996) (barring admiralty suit alleging navigational chart inaccurate).
229. 22 U.S.C. § 3761:
(d) Action for damages on claims cognizable under this chapter; action against officers or
employees of United States for injuries resulting from acts outside scope of their employ-
ment. Except as provided in section 1416 of this Act [22 U.S.c. § 3776], no action for
damages on claims cognizable under this chapter shall lie against the United States or the
Commission, and no such action shall lie against any officer or employee of the United
States ....
See Husted v. United States, 667 F. Supp. 831, 832 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 779 F.2d 58 (11th
Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision) (dismissing FTCA auto accident suit and accepting
argument that "the Panama Canal Act of 1979 ... provides for general immunity regarding
actions against the United States or its Panama Canal Commission for actions arising in the
Canal Zone").
230. 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(2).The statute, enacted in 1996, bars suit by prisoners for mental
or emotional injury unless accompanied by a physical injury. It states:
No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while awaiting sentencing or while
serving a sentence may bring a civil action against the United States or an agency, officer,
or employee of the Government, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury.
The Anti-Assignment Act presents a different sort of absolute bar. It
prohibits any transfer or assignment of any claim against the United States
until after the "claim is allowed, the amount ... is decided, and a warrant
for payment ... has been issued.... "231 The Anti-Assignment Act applies
to voluntary assignments but not transfers required by operation of law.232
It prohibits assignment of tort claims against the United States.2JJ
C. Other Statutes That Bar Suit
Even in the absence of exclusivity language, where a statute assigns a par-
ticular court jurisdiction over a subject, that jurisdiction may be exclusive
and bar FfCA liability. For instance, the Clean Water Act grants the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over claims to recover certain cleanup
costs from the United States.2J4 Because Congress picked that court to re-
The bar only applies while the prisoner remains incarcerated. See generally Kerr v. Puckett,
138 F.3d 321,323 (7th Cir. 1998). The "physical injury" requirement may be satisfied by
a "less-than-significant-but-more-than-de minimis physical injury as a predicate to allega-
tions of emotional injury." Perez v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42906 (M.D. Pa.
May 30,2008) (holding immediate effects of asthma attack were de minimis) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act operates effectively as an exception to the lawenforce-
ment proviso exception to the § 2680(h) exceptions to the ITeA's waiver of sovereign im-
munity. Whether it is worthwhile to deal a third time with the § 2680(h) avatar in the lecture
setting depends upon the time available and the mood of the audience.
231. 31 U.S.c. § 3727:
§ 3727. Assignments of claims
(a) In this section, "assignment" means-
(1) a transfer or assignment of any part of a claim against the United States Govern-
ment or of an interest in the claim; or
(2) the authorization to receive payment for any part of the claim.
(b)An assignment may be made only after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is
decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued ....
232. The "statute ... is aimed at voluntary assignments and does not affect transfers by
operation of law." Danielson v. United States, 416 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing Er-
win v. United States, 97 U.S. 392 (1878) ("obligation owing to the trustees in bankruptcy ...
by virtue of law ... is not voluntary and a transfer pursuant to ... [court] order is not such
a transfer as falls within the provisions of the Anti-Assignment statute"».
233. United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1952) (holding that ITCA suit for
damaged property purchased by plaintiff violated the Anti-Assignment Act).
The Anti-Assignment Act also prohibits the sale of annuities from structured settlements
funded by the United States. Transamerica Assurance Corp. v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 2d
691,695 (WD. Ky. 2006), aff'd, TransAmerica Assurance Corp. v. Settlement Capital Corp.,
489 F.3d 256,257 (6th Cir. 2007).
234. 33 U.S.c. § 1321(i):
(i) Recovery of removal costs
In any case where an owner or operator of a vessel or an onshore facility or an offshore
facility from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of subsection (b)
(3) of this section acts to remove such oil or substance in accordance with regulations pro-
mulgated pursuant to this section, such owner or operator shall be entitled to recover the
solve those claims, its jurisdiction over cleanup cost is held to be exclu-
sive.235Accordingly, suits for cleanup costs cannot be brought under the
ITCA.236
Likewise, when statutes create comprehensive remedy programs, those
remedies may be held to be exclusive and to preclude suit in tort even
if they do not contain exclusivity language. For example, the Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act (CSRA)237is held to be the exclusive remedy by which
federal employees can seek redress of employment-related grievances238
or improper job actions,239barring ITCA liability. The Prison Industries
Fund240that creates a workers' compensation-type remedy for federal pris-
oners, is held to be the exclusive, non-ITCA remedy for prisoners injured
while working in prison industries.241In a similar vein, the existence of a
reasonable costs incurred in such removal upon establishing, in a suit which may be brought
against the United States Government in the United States Court of Federal Claims, that
such discharge was caused solely by
(A) an act of God,
(B) an act of war,
(C) negligence on the part of the United States Government, or
(D) an act or omission of a third party without regard to whether such act or omission
was or was not negligent, or of any combination of the foregoing causes.
235. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 684 F.2d 871, 873 (Ct. Cl. 1982) ("the stat-
ute, therefore, clearly allocates exclusive jurisdiction of subsection (i)(l) actions to the Court
of Claims .... ").
236. See Platte Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 610, 611-12 (10th Cir. 1988)
(''IT]he Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.... IT]he intent of Con-
gress as reflected in the Clean Water Act would be frustrated if Platte were allowed to bring
an action for cleanup costs under the FTCA.").
237. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codi-
fied at scattered sections of 5 U.S. C.).
238. Kennedyv. U.S. Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) (barring suit where
supervisor destroyed plaintiff's records: "Federal employees alleging employment-related
tort claims subject to the CSRA may not bring an action under the FTCA.").
239. Premachandra v. United States, 739 F.2d 392, 394 (8th Cir. 1984) (barring FTCA suit
by VA employee who had been wrongly discharged and then reinstated: "Congress did intend
the civil service laws to provide the sole remedy for federal employees in Premachandra's
circumstances.").
240. 18 U.S.c. § 4126.
241. See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); Vanderv. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 268
F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2001):
The Prison Industries Fund may be used to compensate "inmates ... for injuries suffered
in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation
of the institution in which the inmates are confined." 18 U.S.c. §4126(c). That is the sole
source of compensation for the injury; its remedy is exclusive.
Prisoners can bring suit under the FTCA for injuries they incur outside their prison industry
workplace.SeePlununerv. United States, 580 F.2d72, 77 (3dCir.1978)(allowingsuitformenta1
suffering by eight prisoners who contracted tuberculosis from a prisoner who had the disease).
See generally United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
comprehensive system of benefits and support for military service mem-
bers was a key factor in the Supreme Court's Feres decision, holding that
the ¥rCA did not waive sovereign immunity for claims arising incident to
military service.242
V. CONCLUSION
The ¥rCA succeeds at the task Congress set for it. It generally waives
the United States' sovereign inununity for the torts of federal employees
and provides an effective mechanism to resolve claims against the gov-
ernment administratively or, if necessary judicially. It also preserves the
United States' sovereign immunity as Congress directed. The ¥rCA can
be readily understood as a drawbridge across the moat of sovereign immu-
nity, providing a remedy for those claims that fit within the bounds of the
drawbridge, comply with the procedures of the bridge keeper, and avoid
the exceptions Congress built into the bridge.
